The doctrine commonly designated, “penal substitution,” is fraught with immense, even insurmountable, difficulties.  Not the least of these problems is the fact that it is locked in utterly irreconcilable conflict with fundamental principles of divine justice.

An Explanation

“Penal substitution” is a very old concept which represents an effort to rationalize the death of Christ in its relation to human salvation by extending it to all aspects of a judicial analogy.  It has been especially popular among Evangelicals.  Though its more sophisticated elaboration is not necessarily fully embraced, or even appreciated, by all its proponents, the essential concept behind it is that sinners are saved by Christ standing in as a substitute on the cross for them and accepting the punishment due them for their sins by taking them upon Himself as if He were their perpetrator — hence, its name.  From this basic idea, a more complex system of thought has evolved.

Four elements are discernible in penal substitution:  (1) sins are transferred to Christ, (2) God’s wrath is thereby aroused against Christ, (3) God punishes sin in Christ through His crucifixion, and (4) Christ’s spiritual death ensues as God separates Himself from Christ on the cross.

Though not all advocates of penal substitution acknowledge, articulate, or accentuate all four of these elements with the same consciousness and consistency its logic requires, once its premise is embraced, they link up in an interlocking chain of causes and effects.  To be specific, if sins themselves, or guiltiness for them, were transferred to Christ, then the logical implication is that He was punished for others’ sins on the cross.  Furthermore, if sins were transferred to Christ and He were punished for them, then this further implies that He became the object of God’s anger, just as is true of a sinner (cf. Rom. 2:5,8).  This, then, also assumes that the Father withdrew from the sin-laden Christ on the cross.  Christ’s cry (Matt. 27:46) and the three hours of darkness (vs. 45) are interpreted to support this idea.  Indeed, some pursue logical consistency to such lengths that they claim that Christ in some way experienced hell.

The following quotations offer further comprehension and confirmation as to what is entailed in penal substitution:

“… The Scriptures … teach that He was the substitute for sinners; that He bore their guilt and suffered the penalty of the law in their stead …” (Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pg. 499).

“… Christ died not only on our behalf but also in our place” (Donald G. Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology, Vol. 2, pg. 150).  “The holy God makes himself the object of his own wrath in the person of his Son ….  But the deeper meaning is that God in the person of his Son experiences the death and hell which humankind deserves …” (Ibid., pp. 160,161).  “There on the cross Jesus Christ, the Son of God, reaped the consequences of what a fallen mankind has sown, namely, sin, death, and hell” (Ibid., pg. 172).  “God’s wrath has been assuaged … only because God in his love chose to … suffer what we deserve to suffer because of our sin” (Ibid., pg. 174).

“He took my sins and my sorrows, He made them His very own; He bore the burden to Calv’ry, And suffered, and died alone” (Charles H. Gabriel, “My Savior’s Love,” Sacred Selections, 32^nd ed., No. 303, 3^rd stanza).

“And when Christ died on that cross, He became guilty of lying, He became guilty of slander, He became guilty of jealousy, He became guilty of the most filthy, dirty sins.  Christ took the hell that you and I deserve” (“The Cross” – Billy Graham’s Final Sermon).

Billy Graham’s statement is especially startling and revealing.  It is an important reminder of the fact that, if Jesus bore the guilt of sins in general, then He bore the guilt of any one of those sins in particular.  Sin exists only when God’s law is violated (Rom. 4:15; 5:13; 7:8), not as some amorphous, abstract principle.  No one can bear the guilt of a sin without having committed it.  Therefore, it is simply not enough to assert that Jesus was guilty of sins in general, because those sins can be separated out and specifically identified as lying, blasphemy, murder, fornication, etc.  If the guilt of many sins was transferred to Christ, then the guilt of any one, and every one, of them in particular was transferred to Him.

Hence, to appreciate the seriousness of penal substitution, one should know that it teaches that Jesus was not just laden with sin but with theft, rape, murder, fornication, drunkenness, homosexuality, blasphemy, lying, etc. (cf. 1 Cor. 6:9-11).  Penal substitution would have people believe that the Father saw Christ on the cross as a thief, rapist, murderer, fornicator, drunkard, homosexual, blasphemer, liar, etc. — that of the three crucified that day at Golgotha, Christ was by far the worst.  If one were to name any sin of which a person could be forgiven, then that is a sin for which Jesus, while He was on the cross, was held guilty of having committed.  This is what one must accept if he embraces penal substitution.

Now, any who might expect brethren to recoil from such full-throated expressions of penal substitution would be wrong!  This should not be surprising.  There is not much room for a middle ground here.  Once someone takes hold of the first link, he finds that the rest of the chain comes with it.

“Second, knowing that man could not pay for his own sin, God in love sent his only Son to bear the burden of our sins on the cross. …  Enduring the horror of this awful burden the Son of God cried, ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken Me?’ (Matthew 27:46).  Christ was actually tasting the hell we deserve, being separated from God by the burden of man’s sins.  This suffering was far more horrible than the mere death of the body” (Jule Miller, Visualized Bible Study Series, No. 4, frame no. 45).

“Sins of believers are punished in Christ instead of in us” (David Posey, Focus, Aug. 1999, pg. 8).

“When Jesus spoke of drinking the cup, He used an expression well known to students of Scripture.  He spoke of drinking God’s wrath, of being the object of God’s punishment.  The cup Jesus would drink was more than just enduring the scourging, the nailing onto the cross, and the asphyxiating death.  He was also going to be the object of God’s anger. …  Why was the object of God’s absolute pleasure to be the recipient of God’s fierce wrath?  …  The reason God’s anger ceased is because Jesus drank the cup of God’s wrath.  God whipped Jesus in our place.  The cup of wrath that our sins richly deserved was quaffed by the Lord Himself. …  God has not punished us for our sins; instead, He took the punishment upon Himself.  He suffered the wrath our sins deserved. …  He not only suffered great physical anguish, but He suffered God’s wrath, God’s punishment, in our place.  We will never have to experience this wrath since … He suffered the punishment merited by our sins” (Gary Fisher, Beneath the Cross, pp. 96-98).

Gary Fisher errs in two fundamental ways here.  First, he assumes that because the symbolism of “the cup” in the Prophets is sometimes that of God’s wrath, then it must carry the same symbolism in Jesus’ reference to His cup.  Nothing forces, or even necessarily suggests, such a conclusion.  “Cup” might have various meanings in different contexts.  David’s overflowing “cup” symbolized God’s blessings (Psa. 23:5; cf. 16:5).

Second, though he observes that Jesus “spoke with James and John about drinking His cup (Matt. 20.22-23; Mark 10.38-39),” he ignores the identification of Christ’s “cup” in these texts and mysteriously asks, “So, what cup was Jesus going to drink?” (Ibid., pg. 95).  The two texts he had just cited provide a ready answer:  “He said to them, ‘My cup you shall drink …’” (Matt. 20:23).  Whatever Jesus’ cup was, it was the same one that James and John would drink.  That James and John obviously did not drink the cup of God’s wrath shows that neither did Jesus.  Yet, James and John did drink the cup of suffering (Acts 5:40; 12:2; Rev. 1:9), as Jesus did.  This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that, in Mark’s account (10:38,39), Jesus equated “the cup” they all three would drink with “the baptism” they all three would undergo.  This was a baptism of “suffering,” not a baptism of God’s wrath (cf. Lk. 12:50).

“Jesus’ physical death was the penalty for sin (Rom. 6:23); that was part of it, but not all of it — nor even the most important part.  Ezekiel 18.20 says, ‘The soul that sinneth, it shall die.’  Notice:  the soul shall die, not just the body.  … The penalty of sin is separation from God — spiritual death. …  At this moment Jesus bore the guilt of the world’s sin.  Picture all of the sins from the beginning of time to the cross and all of the sins from the cross until the end of time, and in one huge noxious mass — Jesus bore it all. …  As Jesus became sin, God had to separate His presence from Jesus for the first time in eternity.  As He did, darkness fell upon the earth, symbolizing the departure of God’s presence.  Jesus suffered spiritual death; His soul was snuffed out.  And as He bore our guilt, He suffered alone without the presence of the Father. …  He tasted and experienced spiritual death on our behalf so we would never have to. …  His purpose was to suffer for our sins — to bear the full force of the punishment that we deserved” (Brent Hunter, Beneath the Cross, pp. 176,177).

“Get the Picture”?

Those who embrace penal substitution might hasten to distinguish the idea that Jesus was held guilty for sin from the idea that He was guilty of sin, or actually sinned.  This is a quibble.  While no one believes Jesus actually sinned, it is effectively a distinction without a difference to say that the guilt of sin was accredited to Jesus but that He did not sin.  If Jesus is held guilty for the sins of sinners, this must mean that it was as if He committed their sins.

Penal substitution rests entirely on the idea that there is no moral difference between Jesus being a sinner and His being held guilty for sin.  If this is not true, then the whole bottom drops out of penal substitution.  It loses its very raison d’ętre.  It becomes utterly meaningless.

Perhaps it was inadvertent for him to do so, but Brent Hunter’s application of Ezekiel (18:20) to Jesus in his attempt to establish that Jesus had to die spiritually demonstrates this:  “Ezekiel 18.20 says, ‘The soul that sinneth, it shall die.’  Notice:  the soul shall die, not just the body.”  Yes, but what soul is it that dies?  It is “the soul that sinneth”!  If this text were correctly applied to Jesus to demonstrate that He experienced spiritual death, then it must logically follow that the foregoing part of the verse — “the soul that sinneth …” — must also be applied to Him.  One cannot use its consequence (“die”) without also accepting the cause (“sinneth”) it cites for that consequence.  This one verse slams the door shut on penal substitution!  Unless one is willing to assert what Scripture denies — that Jesus sinned (1 Pet. 2:22) — then he cannot assert that Jesus died spiritually on the cross.

Yet, all of this shows that when penal substitutionists say that Jesus became sin (cf. 2 Cor. 5:21), they take it to mean that He essentially became a sinner.  After all, if people are to conceive of Jesus on the cross as sin personified, how much worse can it be for them to think of Him as the sinner who committed sin?  Can it be that they dare call Him “sin” (personified) and lade Him with all the sins ever committed and that will be committed but shrink from thinking of Him as a sinner?  If penal substitutionists say that it was not that Jesus sinned but only that it was as if He had sinned and only that God got angry at Him and punished Him as if He sinned, what is the moral difference between these two conceptions of Jesus on the cross?

So, it is effectively a point without a point for penal substitutionists to assert that it was as if Jesus sinned but He did not sin.  Evangelicals not only recognize this but embrace the idea that Jesus on the cross was, for all practical purposes, a sinner:  “This means that Christ suffered not just like a sinner but as a sinner” (Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology, Vol. 1, pg. 159).  At least they are consistent, and brethren who embrace penal substitution must likewise realize that, if what penal substitution is true, Jesus on the cross could hardly have been any morally worse than if He had actually committed “all of the sins from the beginning of time … until the end of time.”  That would include bestiality, prostitution, pederasty, genocide, child sacrifice, serial whoremongering, and every abomination imaginable, and then some.  Yet, the reader is not merely invited to contemplate penal substitution on a conceptual level — he is actually encouraged to visualize, to “picture,” it.  There can be no question about it:  the conception which penal substitutionists urge people to have of Jesus on the cross is nothing short of pornographic!

Penal substitution is not just wrong — it is embarrassing!  Indeed, one of the more befuddling questions about it is how it could not be considered blasphemous.

“What Meanest Thou …?”

Anyone who thinks this portrayal of penal substitution is “over the top” needs to go back and re-read what its own proponents have to say about it.  This language is not one bit stronger than what penal substitution demands that its adherents accept.  Those who contemplate eating a hearty-looking stew might first want to inquire into its ingredients!

Indeed, penal substitution might not be so attractive if its advocates were challenged to spell out exactly what it means.  Penal substitutionists might speak in sterile, clinical terms of humanity’s sins being “imputed” to Jesus on the cross.  If they want to intensify the pathos of Jesus crucified, they might even resort to saying He bore the “guilt” of sin.  For an even more dramatic portrayal of Jesus on the cross, they might get so bold as to have God get angry at Him as if He were hardly less sinful than Satan himself, with that immense, noxious mass of sins which ever have been, or will be, committed made His very own, and smite Him in disgust.  Thus, they could replace the lyrics, “He took my sins and my sorrows,” and sing with equal gusto, “He took my drunks and my whoredoms, He made them His very own.”   Why not?  Is this not what they believe?  It is a poor doctrine whose proponents are scandalized to describe it.

Penal Substitution and Calvinism

Penal substitution is just one of three Calvinistic forms of imputation (i.e., an accounting of one’s own to another):  (1) the transfer of Adam’s sin to his posterity (original sin), (2) the transfer of humanity’ sin to Christ (penal substitution), and (3) the transfer of Christ’s righteousness to humanity (Ibid.).  In fact, at least one writer adopts, not only this concept of Calvinism, but even its vocabulary:  “An incredible imputation.  ‘All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all’” (Sewell Hall, Beneath the Cross, pg. 104).

Brethren have generally eschewed Calvinism.  However, for purposes of this study, it is critically important that it be understood that this has not been primarily because Calvinists cannot amass Scriptures which, at least superficially, appear to be straight-forward statements of their tenets.  Rather, brethren feel compelled, and rightly so, to reject typical Calvinistic concepts because they are fundamentally irreconcilable with the moral character of God.  Thus, they have always given texts alternative or figurative interpretations which defer to divine moral character, which must be given precedence.  Any interpretation which is incompatible with God’s righteousness must yield to another.  For example, “visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children, on the third and fourth generations,” is metonymy of cause, in which the physical consequences of the forebears’ iniquity, and not the iniquity itself, falls upon their descendants (Ex. 20:5).  Likewise, “in sin my mother conceived me” (Psa. 51:5b) is hyperbole.

The Scriptures’ teaching about the absolutely righteous character of God drives these interpretations.  It must be upheld.  It admits no exceptions.  “… There is no unrighteousness in Him” (Psa. 92:15).  “… There is no injustice with God …” (Rom. 9:14).  Bible interpretation must begin with that and the interpretation of every other text built around it.  Yet, the irony is that penal substitution, supposedly demanded by God’s justice, actually destroys it.

Thus, the first and most fundamental reason Calvinism is to be rejected is because it collides with the righteousness of God and is, therefore, morally repulsive.  The idea that God would transfer the sin of Adam to his posterity so as to cause all but a few of them to be lost in hell, is repugnant.  To appreciate this, one might imagine millions, if not billions, of children and infants, including unborn and stillborn, awakening to consciousness in the flames of eternal torment through no effort or fault of their own but merely because God transferred to them, as if they had committed it, the sin of one person who lived thousands of years before their time.

Yet, while brethren reject the imputation of Adamic sin because it is so thoroughly offensive to the justice of God, they readily embrace the imputation of sin to Christ on the cross.  They evince no compulsion to interpret texts so that they do no violence to the moral character of God, as is the case in their opposition to the imputation of Adamic sin.  Instead, they unabashedly accept the idea that God may transfer sin from the guilty (sinners) to the innocent (Christ).  Yet, there is no principle which would make the transference of sin from a guilty party (sinners) to an innocent party (Christ) something just and morally noble in the case of penal substitution but make the same transference of sin from another guilty party (Adam) to another innocent party (children) unjust and morally repugnant.  The two scenarios are essentially the same, but some brethren somehow manage to see them as moral opposites.

The fact of the matter is that brethren who embrace penal substitution surrender the moral high ground.  Again, the primary objection to the imputation of Adam’s guilt to all of his descendants (“original sin”) is a moral one.  It is, in a word, unjust.  The transference of guilt for wrongdoing from the perpetrator to the innocent, and the punishment of it in the innocent are contrary to the principle of justice and the moral character of God upon whom justice is founded.

Though the focus has been on the transference of sin, the same can be said for the transference of righteousness, as is asserted in the doctrine of the imputation of the righteousness or obedience of Christ to the believer’s account.  The three-fold doctrine of imputation might be viewed as a three-legged stool:  it stands or falls by any one of its three legs.  Thus, there is no fundamental reason to oppose the two other expressions of imputation if one feels free to accept penal substitution, or the imputation of sin to Christ.

Calvinists have long understood that these three expressions of imputation are to be lumped together and equated.  “… By all theologians, Reformed and Lutheran, it is admitted, that in the imputation of Adam’s sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of Christ’s righteousness to believers, the nature of imputation is the same, so that the one case illustrates the others. …  In virtue of the union between [Adam] and his descendants, his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race, precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people” (Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 194,195).  Hodge quotes Jonathan Edwards to the same effect:  “‘Why is there any more absurdity in supposing that Christ’s obedience is imputed to us, than that his satisfaction is imputed?  If Christ has suffered the penalty of the law for us, and in our stead, then it will follow that his suffering that penalty is imputed to us, i. e., that it is accepted for us, and in our stead, and is reckoned to our account, as though we had suffered it.  But why may not his obeying the law of God be as rationally reckoned to our account as his suffering the penalty of the law.’ [sic]  He then goes on to argue that there is the same necessity for the one as for the other” (Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 148,149).  To this extent, Calvinists are exactly correct:  consistency demands that their three points of imputation stand or fall together.  Neither Scripture nor logic offer any more resistance to one form of imputation than to the other two, so that one who finds any one of them acceptable and compelling will find either of the other two equally so.

A Bedrock Principle

That no one can be given the guilt of sin and be punished for it without having committed sin is a basic principle of justice which is firmly founded on the moral character of God and clearly expressed in Scripture.  Nevertheless, it is blithely ignored for the sake of original sin and penal substitution.

Yet, the Lord had this principle institutionalized in the Law of Moses, who commanded, “Fathers shall not be put to death for their sons, nor shall sons be put to death for their fathers; everyone shall be put to death for his own sin” (Deut. 24:16).  King Amaziah of Judah had his father’s assassins executed, but he honored this law by refusing to put their sons to death (2 Kgs. 14:6).  Though he gave it an imperfect application, Abraham also expressed recognition of this fundamental principle when he tried to persuade God not to destroy Sodom with the righteous in it:  “Wilt Thou indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked?  …  Far be it from Thee to do such a thing, to slay the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous and the wicked are treated alike.  Far be it from Thee!  Shall not the Judge of all the earth deal justly?” (Gen. 18:23-25).

However, this is only an extension into civil law and human relations of what was first a basic and inviolable principle of divine justice.  God Himself declared it when He refused, as a matter of principle, to blot Moses out of His book of life instead of punishing the Israelites for the golden calf:  “… Whoever has sinned against Me, I will blot him out of My book.  … In the day when I punish, I will punish them for their sin” (Ex. 32:33,34).

Yet, this principle finds perhaps its clearest and most forceful expression, and certainly its most extensive one, in the words which God spoke through Ezekiel (18:1ff).  The Jews had complained that their defeat and exile by the Babylonians were an instance of the sentiment captured in the proverb:  “The fathers eat the sour grapes, but the children’s teeth are set on edge” (vs. 2).  This was simply a metaphorical way of saying that the children were suffering the punishment for the sins which their fathers had committed.

God emphatically and explicitly denies that He will have the innocent bear the punishment for the sins of the wicked:  “The soul who sins will die.  … The son will not bear the punishment for the father’s iniquity, nor will the father bear the punishment for the son’s iniquity; the righteousness of the righteous will be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked will be upon himself” (vss. 4,20).

Though a father and son are used for a specific application of this principle because their relationship makes them the most likely candidates to anyone bent on such vicarious punishment, this in no way limits its general application.  Immediately after citing the specific example, He expresses the principle in the most general terms by referring to “the righteous” and “the wicked” (vs. 20).

Now, it is critical to God’s ultimate exoneration from the Israelites’ charge to distinguish between the physical consequences of sin and the punishment of sin.  The easiest way to see this lies in the observation that physical death has nothing to do with a person’s sins.  This is to say that every person will die whether he is righteous or sinful (Heb. 9:27).  Methuselah, who died in the year of the flood, was apparently a wicked man but had the longest lifespan recorded in Scripture (Gen. 5:27).  Jesus, on the other hand, never committed a single sin but died at 33 years of age or so.  It has been true as far back as Cain and Abel that there is no necessary correlation between physical death and life, on one hand, and wickedness and righteousness, on the other.  The righteous sometimes suffer and die at the hands, and because, of sinners, and the latter might sometimes enjoy a longer life, and perhaps an even more enjoyable one, because of their sins (cf. Psa. 73; cf. Eccl. 7:15).  Also, God holds open the possibility that the wicked man will not die when He urges him to “repent and live” (Ezek. 18:30-32).  The only death repentance can necessarily prevent for the sinner is “the second death,” hell (Rev. 2:11; 21:8), for physical death will occur anyway and spiritual death in separation from God has already occurred (Lk. 9:60; Rom. 6:23; Eph. 2:1,5; 1 Tim. 5:6; Rev. 3:1).  This understanding is essential to relieving God of the Jews’ charge.

Further confirming that God does not punish anyone for the sins of others is the fact that He has never done so.  Now, of course, proponents of penal substitution might cite the crucifixion of Christ as an instance of His doing so.  However, this is a mere assertion; the onus of either reconciling penal substitution with the aforementioned Scriptures or establishing that it is an exception rests on them.

Furthermore, if it were morally permissible and just for God to hold Christ guilty for the sins of others and punish those sins in Him, then it might be expected that at least one other example of Him punishing another for the sins or crimes committed by someone else could be adduced from the Scriptures.  Yet, not only did God forbid such a procedure, in both civil (Deut. 24:16) and spiritual (Ex. 32:31-34; Ezek. 18:4ff) law, but He also applied that law with perfect consistency.  There are no examples to the contrary in Scripture.  This is not surprising, unless it is to be supposed that the Lord issues laws which both He and His people are regularly allowed to ignore.

Two objections can be anticipated and addressed.  First, some might simply claim that there are such exceptions to the principle stated (e.g., Josh. 7:19-26; 2 Sam. 21:1-14).  If so, the claimant must accept the burden of reconciling such instances with the law of God.  Also, on more careful investigation of the instances proposed as exceptions, it is not immediately clear, to say the least, that those executed were not in some way involved in the crimes for which they were executed.

Second, it might be countered that, while other humans are disqualified by their own sins to serve as a sacrifice for sins of others, Christ was perfectly innocent of sin.  Yet, if innocence were what qualified Christ to serve as a sacrifice for sin, then many, many other innocent humans have been available for such a purpose.  They are children prior to “the age of accountability” (1 Cor. 14:20; Rom. 9:11; 16:19), and, in fact, idolaters sacrificed their children (e.g., 2 Chr. 33:6; Jer. 32:35).  Also, to cite innocence in the one punished as a reason why it would be acceptable to punish him instead of the actual perpetrator does nothing to relieve the immoral and illegal nature of what is done but, rather, exacerbates it.  For example, authorities learning after they have executed a man for murder that he was innocent of that crime might find some relief from knowing that he was a rapist or had committed another murder and say, “He got what he deserved anyway.”  The point is this:  the sense of the wrongfulness of executing a man for crimes committed by others increases or decreases in proportion to his general guilt or innocence.  Otherwise, remorse for wrongfully executing otherwise reputable citizens would be felt no more keenly than remorse for wrongfully executing those with criminal records.  Thus, to cite Christ’s crucifixion as an instance of God’s willingness to punish the innocent for the sins of others does nothing to relieve the moral difficulty of penal substitution; it just restates it.

So, the assertion that penal substitution is nothing more than an exception to God’s law that the innocent cannot be punished for the sins of others is glib.  First, if this is so, then it would turn justice on its head.  Why should Christ be the one exception?  If He can be an exception, then why can there not be many exceptions?  In fact, if it is morally and judicially permissible to punish any for the crimes and sins of others, then why is this not regularly done?  Whenever a crime is committed, why bother to identify, apprehend, indict, try, and punish the perpetrator?  Why not grab anyone not even remotely associated with the crime off the street or from his home and punish him, if it is morally acceptable to punish the innocent for the crimes of the guilty?  This might sound harsh, but this is precisely what penal substitutionists claim was done in the case of Christ’s death.  It is a most peculiar doctrine, indeed, when its advocates must otherwise shrink from it.

Second, while exceptions can be made to rules or laws, they cannot be arbitrarily made.  They must be understood, inferred, or inherent in the nature of the case, if not authorized, justified, or specified in some other way.  For instance, Paul said that the Father is an exception to the declaration (Psa. 8:6) that all things were put under Christ’s feet, but he also said, “… It is evident …” (1 Cor. 15:27).  Exceptions cannot simply be arbitrarily claimed; they must be justified.

Third, there are no exceptions to moral principles.  It is hardly expected that space needs to be yielded here to defend this proposition to those who oppose situation ethics.  If so, the only consideration now is whether penal substitution falls into the category of morality.  It is hardly imaginable that it could be regarded otherwise or that anything is a matter of moral consideration if penal substitution is not.  First, the taking of life, and whether doing so is right or wrong, is the premier concern of morality.  Indeed, it is why this question is even being addressed at all.

Second, justice is inherently moral, and it is in an attempt to satisfy justice that penal substitution is even proposed.  It is thought to grow fundamentally out of the idea that the very moral character and government of God requires it.

Thus, it binds the proponent of penal substitution in an irreconcilable contradiction to assert, in the manner of an ipse dixit, that Christ’s supposed punishment on the cross for the sins of others is a mere exception to God’s principle of justice that the innocent cannot be punished for the sins of the guilty.  It is simply not possible that there can be even one exception to God’s moral nature or laws.  If so, then God could make an exception to His declaration that He cannot lie (Heb. 6:18; Tit. 1:2), and He lied when He said He could not!  Also, it is presumable that, if there are exceptions to God’s moral laws and that they are, by virtue of that, no longer to be considered absolute, then humans might begin to detect, and avail themselves of, others.

Furthermore, it is existentially impossible that Christ could have been viewed, and held, as guilty for sins He did not commit.  It is simply in the nature of the case that the righteous cannot be made (or declared) guilty of sin, nor that the unrighteous can be made (or declared) innocent by making (or declaring) the righteous guilty of the sins of the unrighteous.  This is simply because innocence and guilt, or righteousness and unrighteousness, or one’s moral and spiritual status, are non-transferrable.  From a moral standpoint, one cannot effectively become what he actually is not.  God declares that evil can no more become good, and vice versa, than darkness can become light or bitter can become sweet (Isa. 5:20).  It would make as much sense as “dry water.”  All of this is really just a paraphrase of what God Himself says:  “… The righteousness of the righteous will be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked will be upon himself” (Ezek. 18:20).  Penal substitution precisely contradicts this truth in the case of Christ by putting upon Him the wickedness of others.  It declares what cannot be, and by declaring what is contrary to the facts, it necessarily, in the very nature of the case, declares a lie.

To understand why this is the case, one must understand that to be sinful, or be made guilty of sin, is just another way of saying one actually committed sin.  A person actually has to commit sin to be guilty for sin.  There are no exceptions to this in the Bible.  This is because sin is something a person does, not something he is.  Sin(-fulness) is an act he does, not just a fact he has.  Scripture testifies to this:  “Whosoever committeth sin transgresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law. …  He that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous” (1 Jn. 3:4-7, KJV).  Sin, by definition, is a violation of the law (Rom. 4:15; 1 Jn. 3:4).  This is evident from the fact that God never held anyone who did not transgress His law guilty for a sin.  Therefore, if someone does not actually sin, he cannot be viewed, or held, as guilty of sin, and that includes Christ on the cross.  It is really just that simple.

In fact, penal substitution violates this principle not one bit less severely than does original sin.  Thus, there is no reason the former should be right and the latter wrong when they are essentially identical by virtue of transferring guilt from the perpetrator to the innocent.

Now, it might be said that the Scriptures do speak of certain people being made guilty of sin (cf. 1 Kgs. 15:26; Matt. 5:32; Rom. 5:19).  However, in each case it is only because they actually do sin!

Indeed, a major problem with penal substitution is that it portrays unreality as truth.  Even penal substitutionists deny that Jesus was, in reality, a sinner, but they have God view, treat, and shun Him as if there were no difference between Him and a sinner.  Here, God acts in a way which is contrary to reality and indulges Himself in what can best be described as a “cosmic fantasy.”  In fact, it is an additional problem that God could do this, since He must have known, omniscient as He is, that Jesus was not actually guilty of sin.  Could there have been a switch on His knowledge or memory to throw off and on while Jesus was on the cross?  Otherwise, how could God at the same time both know that Jesus was, in reality, perfectly innocent of sin and be wrathful toward Him as if He had committed sin?  Psychologists recognize such a phenomenon as “displaced anger” and rightly regard it as symptomatic of mental unsoundness.

Once it is established that Jesus could not have died a spiritual death on the cross, the case for penal substitution collapses.  If He did not die a spiritual death, then He could not have borne the guilt of sin.  If He did not bear the guilt of sin, then God could not have become wrathful toward Him.  If God did not have to become wrathful toward Him, then God did not have to punish Him for sin.  If God did not have to punish Him for sin, then God did not have to turn away from Him for (His) sin.

Summary and Conclusion

Not only does penal substitution fly in the face of plain Scriptural teaching, but not one of its salient features is directly expressed in Scripture:

Nowhere do the Scriptures say that Jesus was crucified as a substitute for, or in the place of, sinners.

Nowhere do the Scriptures say that Jesus was made guilty for humanity’s sins.

Nowhere do the Scriptures say that God became wrathful toward Jesus.

Nowhere do the Scriptures say that God punished Jesus for humanity’s sins.

Nowhere do the Scriptures say God abandoned Jesus because He was guilty for humanity’s sins.

No one should allow himself to become so frustrated to understand a challenge to his intellect that he resorts to fanciful falsehoods, regardless of how superficially appealing he might find them to be.  This is not an unusual response to difficult questions the Bible might not address and answer to popular satisfaction.  For example, Mormonism became so obsessed with justifying and explaining the salvation or condemnation of pre-Columbian Indians that it concocted stories of Christ preaching to them.  Likewise, the Sadducees offered their own story to discredit the resurrection of the dead, because they could not understand it (Matt. 22:23ff).  The unknown must never be allowed to overthrow what is known, through honest, careful, reverent, repeated study of the Scriptures, to be the truth.   “… Let God be found true, though every man be found a liar …” (Rom. 3:4).  As with any other subject, Bible students must first begin with bedrock principles which they know are right and cannot be wrong and then interpret all other texts to accommodate them (cf. Jn. 10:35).  This approach is correct and has served believers unfailingly well in the past.  Those who forsake it here do so to their peril.

gpeubanks@juno.com

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